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PHI 001: Introduction to Philosophy 2018 The Self and Identity Through Time A Personal Identity Game Staying Alive http://www.philosophersnet.com/games/identity.htm Identity: Numerical v. Qualitative Qualitative Identity = Exact Similarity Numerical Identity = Being One and the Same Thing As Identity: Numerical v. Qualitative A B Are A and B exactly similar Are A and B one and the same thing Identity: Numerical v. Qualitative A B Are A and B exactly similar Are A and B one and the same thing The Indiscernibility of Identicals (Uncontroversial) For any thing x and any thing y, if x is numerically identical to y, then any property that x has y also has, and any property that y has x also has – i.e., then x and y have exactly the same properties. Contrapositive (Equivalent): If there is a property that x has but y lacks, or a property that y has but x lacks, then x is not numerically identical to y. Indiscernibility of Identicals As a slogan: “Having exactly the same properties is necessary for numerical identity.” Indiscernibility of Identicals Obama has the property being over six feet tall. Gilmore does not have that property. So Obama and Gilmore are not numerically identical. Identity of Indiscernibles (Controversial) For any thing x and any thing y, if x and y have exactly the same properties, then x and y are numerically identical. Slogan: “Having exactly the same properties is sufficient for numerical identity.” Personal Identity What is the question (Q1) How can we tell whether a person x, existing at one time, is numerically the same as some person y, existing at a different time Personal Identity What is the question (Q1) How can we tell whether a person x, existing at one time, is numerically the same as some person y, existing at a different time No. This is epistemology. Personal Identity What is the question (Q2) What makes it the case that a person x existing at one time is numerically identical with a person y existing at a different time. When doing metaphysics, we want a theory to specify the grounds of personal identity over time, not merely to give us a reliable to guide that lets us find out when it holds. Personal Identity What do we want from a theory of personal identity over time In other words, what is the question that a theory of personal identity over time is supposed to answer Necessarily, for any x and y, and times t and t*, if x is a person and exists at t, and y exists at t*, then x = y if and only if ___________________________. We want a theory of personal identity to fill in the blank in a way that makes the resulting statement both true and informative. (To avoid circularity, what fills in the blank must not presuppose an understanding of the concept of personal identity over time.) Personal Identity The Matter Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t*, x=y if and only if the matter that x is made of at t is the same matter as the matter that y is made of at t*. Is being made of the same matter really sufficient for personal identity Is it really necessary The Matter Theory Case 1: The anti-matter gun. Let Person1 be the person who exists at t1 and is composed at t1 of parcel of matter M. A split second after t1, the anti-matter gun annihilates the matter that composed the tip of Person1’s left pinky fingernail. Let Person2 be the person who exists (in roughly the same place as Person1 was located at t1) shortly after the anti-matter gun is applied. Person2 is composed at t2 of parcel of matter M*. Parcel of matter M is not the same as parcel of matter M* (they merely overlap). The Matter Theory Argument A against the matter theory 1. If the matter theory is true, then Person1 is not numerically identical to Person2. 2. Person1 is numerically identical to Person2. ——————– 3. The matter theory is not true. The Matter Theory Argument A, if successful, shows that sameness of constituent matter is not necessary sufficient for personal identity over time. The Matter Theory Argument A, if successful, shows that sameness of constituent matter is not necessary for personal identity over time. The Matter Theory Case 2. Oratorious, the famed Roman statesman, is composed at t1 of matter M. He dies, his corpse rots, and M is scattered all over Earth. Two thousand years later, by wild coincidence, M has once again taken the form a person, George U. Bush: Bush is composed of M at t2. Aside from the odd fact that he is made of M, there does not appear to be anything unusual about his history: records indicate that he developed from a 7 pound infant born in 1943. The Matter Theory Argument B against the matter theory 1. If the matter theory is true, then Oratorius is numerically identical with George U. Bush. 2. Oratorious is not numerically identical with George U. Bush. ————————— 3. The matter theory is not true. The Matter Theory Argument B, if successful, shows that sameness of constituent matter is not necessary sufficient for personal identity over time. The Matter Theory Argument B, if successful, shows that sameness of constituent matter is not sufficient for personal identity over time. Personal Identity The Soul Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t*, x=y if and only if the soul that x has at t is the same as the soul that y has at t*. Personal Identity What is a soul To count as a soul (as philosophers use the term), a thing must be immaterial / non-physical / not made of matter, must be capable of causing things to happen, and be capable of being causally affected by other things, must be conscious or play some essential role in giving rise to consciousness, and must be a substance (a thing, like a rock or a ghost) rather than an event (something that happens or occurs, like an explosion or a basketball game) . Personal Identity The Soul Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t*, x=y if and only if the soul that x has at t is the same as the soul that y has at t*. Personal Identity The Soul Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t*, x=y if and only if the soul that x has at t is the same as the soul that y has at t*. Is there any evidence for the existence of souls The No Evidence Argument 1. If the soul theory is true, then either souls exist, or in no case is a person existing at one time numerically identical with some person existing at a different time. 2. In some cases a person existing at one time is numerically identical with a person existing at a different time. 3. There is no empirical evidence for souls. 4. If there is no empirical evidence for souls, then souls do not exist. ———————- 5. The soul theory is not true. The No Evidence Argument 1. If the soul theory is true, then either souls exist, or in no case is a person existing at one time numerically identical with some person existing at a different time. If A then (B or C) 2. In some cases a person existing at one time is numerically identical with a person existing at a different time. Not C 3. There is no scientific reason to postulate souls. D 4. If there is no scientific reason to postulate souls, then souls do not exist. If D then not B ———————- 5. The soul theory is not true. Not A The Instantaneous View Each of us exists, but we are all instantaneous and do not persist through time. No one who exists at one instant, t, is numerically identical to anyone who exists at a later instant, t*. There is a person who exists tomorrow who looks like you, remembers much of what you remember, and answers to your name, but that person is not you. You exist only now. Arguments for Instantaneous View Argument against it The Body Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t*, x=y if and only if the body that x has at t = the body that y has at t*. The Body Theory Problem 1: Corpses The Corpse Argument Against the Body Theory 1. The body of the corpse in my casket = my body. 2. If (1) and the Body Theory is true, then the corpse in my casket is me. 3. The corpse in my casket is not me. (I’ll be gone then.) ————— 4. The Body Theory is not true. The Body Theory Problem 2: Sydney Shoemaker’s Brown- Brownson case. Brown’s brain is transplanted into Robinson’s body. The person who wakes up, call him ‘Brownson’, answers to the name ‘Brown’ and can describe Brown’s life but shows no knowledge of Robinson’s life. The Body Theory The ‘Brownson’ Argument 1. Brownson does not have Brown’s body. 2. If (1) and the Body theory are both true, then Brownson is not Brown. 3. Brownson is Brown. ——— : . The Body theory is not true. The Brain Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t*, x=y if and only if the brain that x has at t = the brain that y has at t*. The Brain Theory Problem 1. Corpses and their brains The Corpse Argument Against the Brain Theory 1. The brain of the corpse in the casket is my brain. 2. If (1) and the Brain Theory is true, then the corpse in the casket is me. 3. The corpse in the casket is not me. ——- .: The Brain theory is not true. John Locke 1632—1704, English A founding father of British Empiricism Problem for Brain and Body theories: a version of Locke’s “Prince and Cobbler” case “Suppose the prince had previously committed a horrible crime, knew the mind-swap would occur, and hoped to use it to escape prosecution. After the swap, the crime is discovered, and the guards come to take the guilty one away. They know nothing of the swap, and so they haul off to jail the person in the prince’s body, ignoring his protestations of innocence. The person in the cobbler’s body (who considers himself the prince) remembers committing the crime and gloats over his narrow escape. This is a miscarriage of justice! The gloating person in the cobbler’s body ought to be punished. If so, then the person in the cobbler’s body is the prince, not the cobbler, for a person ought to be punished only for what he himself did.” (Ted Sider, Riddles of Existence, pp. 14- 15) The Memory Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t1 and y exists at a later time t2, x=y if and only if y has memories at t2 of the experiences that x had at t1. The Memory Theory Problem: The Brave Officer case. Due to Thomas Reid (1710-1796, Scottish) OldMan remembers fighting bravely on the battlefield as an officer (BraveOfficer’s experience). BraveOfficer, while fighting bravely, remembers stealing apples as a boy (Boy’s experience). OldMan does not remember picking fruit. The Memory Theory Problem: The Brave Officer case. Due to Thomas Reid (1710-1796, Scottish) Assume that the Memory Theory is true OldMan remembers fighting bravely on the battlefield as an officer (BraveOfficer’s experience). So: OldMan=Brave Officer (from Memory Theory) BraveOfficer, while fighting bravely, remembers stealing apples as a boy (Boy’s experience). So: Brave Officer=Boy (from Memory Theory) So: OldMan=Boy (from the transitivity of identity) OldMan does not remember picking fruit. So: Not-(OldMan=Boy) (from Memory Theory) So: Oldman=Boy & Not-OldMan=Boy Contradiction The Psychological Continuity Theory Necessarily, for any x and y and t1 and t2, if x is a person and exists at t1 and y exists at t2, then x=y if and only if there is a one- way chain of memory connections linking x at t1 and y at t2 – that is, if and only if x at t1 is psychologically continuous with y at t2. The Psychological Continuity Theory Problem: Duplication Suppose the two hemispheres of Tanya’s brain (each of which encodes Tanya’s full memory and personality) are transplanted into two different brainless bodies. Each of the resulting people, Righty and Lefty, is psychologically continuous with Tanya before the operation. The Duplication Argument Against PTC 1. If PCT is true, then Tanya = Righty and Tanya = Lefty. 2. If Righty = Tanya and Tanya = Lefty, then Righty = Lefty. (Identity is transitive.) 3. Righty≠Lefty. ———————– The PCT is not true. The Non-Branching Psychological Continuity Theory Necessarily, if x is a person existing at t and y exists at t, x=y if and only if x at t and y at t* are related by ‘non-branching psychological continuity’. The Non-Branching Psychological Continuity Theory Problem: Extrinsicness Suppose that I learn that I will undergo a fission operation tomorrow. According to the Non-Branching theory, I survive if just one hemisphere ‘takes’, but I don’t survive if neither takes, and I don’t survive if both take. Righty, if he wakes up at all, will wake up in Room R, and Lefty, if he wakes up at all, will wake up in Room L. According to the Non-Branching theory, whether I wake up in Room R depends in part on what happens in Room L. Assume all will go well in Room R. Then if all goes well in Room L, I won’t wake up in Room R (or anywhere), but if the procedure in Room L fails, then I do wake up in Room R. So whether I wake up in Room R depends upon an ‘extrinsic fact’. But whether some process supports my continued existence shouldn’t depend upon extrinsic facts! It should depend only upon what that process is like intrinsically. The Non-Branching Psychological Continuity Theory A related odd feature of the Non-Branching theory, as applied to the given case: This theory tells us that in the given case, ‘double success’ is worse for me than ‘single success.’ The No-Self Theory Roots in certain schools of ancient Indian Buddhism The Questions of Milinda (100s BC, record of conversation with Nagasena), Milinda = Menander, Greek king of Bactria in today’s Afghanistan – The self is a conceptual construct, a designation, a convention, a mere name Vasubandu (4th century AD): Reductionism Eliminativism – ‘There is no self’, ‘There is no one called Caitra’. Nagarjuna (around 150 AD): rejects reduction of self, embraces elimination of self. Santideva (early 8th century AD) – ‘Without exception, no suffering belongs to anyone . . If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one disputes that! . . .If you argue: for whom is there compassion if no being exists [our response is] for anyone projected through the illusion which is embraced for the sake of what has to be done.’ The No-Self Theory The No-Self Theory: There are no people, souls, selves, or human beings. Whenever the word ‘I’ is used, it fails to refer to anything. Likewise for ‘you’, ‘she’, ‘he’, and ordinary proper names, such as ‘Obama’. These never refer to anything. You do not exist. Neither do I. How could this be Sorabji’s discussion of Buddhist views of the self might help answer this question. Here’s a possibly related answer. . . Compositional Nihilism: There are no composite entities, objects that have parts. There are no chairs, tables, or people. There are simple, fundamental particles (electrons, quarks, . . .). Some such particles are arranged table-wise. Others are arranged human-wise. But there are no groups or collections of particles, which would be composite entities if they existed. There are just the particles themselves. Composite objects are just ‘useful fictions’. René Descartes (1596- 1650) French philosopher and mathematician Inventor of analytic geometry – ‘Cartesian coordinates’ Corresponded with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) The Cogito The Cogito as an objection to the No-Self Theory. Latin: Cogito, ergo sum. English: I think, therefore I am. or: I think, therefore I exist. The Cogito In the Meditations, Descartes never uses the expression ‘cogito, ergo sum’/ ‘I think, therefore I exist’. In parts of other works (e.g., The Principles of Philosophy), he does. The Cogito “This piece of knowledge – I think, therefore I exist – is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way.” Principles of Philosophy, Part I section 7 The Cogito I have just said that I have no senses and no body, and I am so bound up with a body and with senses that one would think that I can’t exist without them. Now that I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world—no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies—does it follow that I don’t exist either No it does not follow; for if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. Cogito v1 1. I am convinced that there is nothing in the world. 2. If I am convinced that there is nothing in the world, then I exist. ——— : . I exist. (adapted from Feldman 1986: 59) The Cogito But there is a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver who deliberately deceives me all the time! Even then, if he is deceiving me I undoubtedly exist: let him deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something. Cogito, v2 1. I am deceived by something. 2. If I am deceived by something, then I exist. ———– : . I exist. Cogito, v3 1. I think that I am something. 2. If think that I am something, then I exist. ———— : . I exist. (Feldman 1986: 60) The Cogito Cogito, v4 1. I think. 2. Whatever thinks exists. ——— : . I exist. The Cogito Cogito, v4 1. I think. (‘think’ means roughly ‘am conscious’ or ‘am undergoing mental activity’) [If you think that you are walking/talking/deceiving someone/surprising someone/holding a diamond, you might be mistaken. But if you think that you are thinking, there is no chance that you are mistaken. Inferential interp: So (1) can be a metaphysical certainty for Descartes.] 2. Whatever thinks exists. ——— : . I exist. The Cogito Cogito, v4 1. I think. (‘think’ means roughly ‘am conscious’ or ‘am undergoing mental activity’) 2. Whatever thinks exists. [If a thing has any properties or features at all, it exists. If won’t have properties at all if it’s not there to have them. If it doesn’t exist, it can’t have any properties or features at all. Thinking is a property. So whatever thinks must exist. Inferential interp: so (2) was a metaphysical certainty for Descartes.] ——— : . I exist. The Cogito Lichtenberg’s objection “We should say ‘it thinks’ just as we say ‘it lightens’ [or ‘it’s raining’]. To say cogito is already to say too much as soon as we translate it ‘I think’. To assume, to postulate the I is a practical requirement.” Georg Chistoph Lichtenberg, The Waste Books, K 18. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg 1742-1799, German The Cogito Lichtenberg’s objection, as stated by Bertrand Russell: “I think” is [Descartes’s] ultimate premiss. Here the word “I” is really illegitimate; he ought to state his ultimate premiss in the form “there are thoughts” (1945: 567). The Cogito A reply to Lichtenberg’s objection: According to Russell, when the cogito is carried out, what is certain ‘from this perspective’ is just following proposition: R There are thoughts or experiences But more is certain than R. If only R were certain, then it wouldn’t be certain that the following is false: I, Zombie There are other people, who are all conscious and have thoughts and experiences, and I exist, but I’m not conscious and don’t have any thoughts or experiences at all. But it is certain that I, Zombie is false. That can be ruled out, from ‘in here.’ So something more than R must be certain.